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Abstract—We consider problems of authentication using secret
key generation under a privacy constraint on the enrolled source
data. An adversary who has access to the stored description and
correlated side information tries to deceive the authentication
as well as learn about the source. We characterize the optimal
tradeoff between the compression rate of the stored description,
the leakage rate of the source data, and the exponent of the
adversary’s maximum false acceptance probability. The related
problem of secret key generation with a privacy constraint is
also studied where the optimal tradeoff between the compression
rate, leakage rate, and secret key rate is characterized. It reveals
a connection between the optimal secret key rate and security of
the authentication system.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of authentication based on secret
key generation. In the enrollment stage, a user provides the
source sequence Xn to the system. The source is compressed
into a description M which is stored as a helping message.
Meanwhile, the secret key message S is generated based on the
source and will be used as a reference for authentication. In
the authentication stage, the user provides an authentication
sequence Y n which could be a noisy measurement of the
enrolled source sequence. Based on M and Y n, the secret
key is estimated as Sˆ and compared with the reference S. The
user is successfully authenticated if Sˆ = S.
The system described above can be relevant in several
applications including those involving access control, secure,
and trustworthy communication. One important class of po-
tential applications is related to using biometric data such as
fingerprint, iris scans, and DNA sequences for authentication
(see, e.g., [1] and references therein). Unlike passwords,
the biometric data inherently belong to users and provide a
convenient and seemingly more secure way for authentication.
However, it is crucial that privacy of the enrolled data must
be protected from any inference of an adversary. The privacy
risk in this case is of potentially high impact since the
biometric data is commonly tied to the person identity. If it
is compromised, it cannot be reverted or changed like in the
case of using passwords.
In this work, we consider the secret-key based authenti-
cation problem in the presence of an adversary, who has
access to the stored description M as well as correlated side
information Zn, as shown in Fig. 1. The adversary tries to
deceive the authentication using its own sequence y˜n and is
also interested in learning about the enrolled source data Xn.
We call the event where the legitimate user fails during the
authentication as a false rejection, and the event where the
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Fig. 1. Secret key-based authentication system with a privacy constraint.
system accepts the adversary as a false acceptance. As for
the privacy constraint, normalized mutual information between
the enrolled source data Xn and all information available
at the adversary, e.g., (M,Zn), is used as a measure of
information leakage rate. We wish to design an authentication
system that achieves negligible false rejection probability and
at the same time minimizes 1) the compression rate of the
stored description, 2) the leakage rate of the enrolled source,
and 3) the maximum false acceptance probability (mFAP)
exponentially. In general, there exists a tradeoff between the
compression rate, the information leakage rate, and the mFAP
exponent. For example, to obtain a large mFAP exponent
while achieving reliable authentication for the legitimate user,
a “high quality” description M may need to be stored which
in turn can lead to high amount of information leakage. The
main result of this work is a single-letter characterization
of the fundamental tradeoff between the compression rate,
information leakage rate, and mFAP exponent for discrete
memoryless sources.
Closely related to the setting described above, we consider
also the problem of secret key generation (for authentication)
with a privacy constraint where, apart from reliable recon-
struction of the secret key, we wish to maximize the secret
key rate as well as ensuring that the leakage rate of the key
is negligible. Also in this case, the optimal tradeoff between
the compression rate, leakage rate of the source, and secret
key rate is characterized. In particular, the optimal secret key
rate is shown to be equivalent to the optimal mFAP exponent
derived in the first problem.
Related Work
Authentication problems from an information theoretic per-
spective have been studied in several directions. Maurer in [2]
considered the message authentication problem in connection
with the hypothesis testing problem where the underlying
message probability distributions of the legitimate user and
adversary are assumed to be different. Martinian et al. [3]
considered authentication with a distortion criteria. More re-
cently, works appear to consider authentication problems based
on secret key generation [4]. These include for example works
[5], [6], [7] which focused on biometric authentication systems
where privacy of the enrolled data is also taken into account.
Analysis of deception probability in the authentication system
from an adversary’s perspective was also considered in [8].
Closely related to the secret key-based authentication problem
with privacy constraint are the problems of source coding
with privacy constraint, e.g., [9], [10], where the goals are to
reconstruct the source reliably while preserving the privacy of
the source or the reconstruction sequences from any inference
of an eavesdropper. In this work, we extend the problem in [6]
to a more general case where the adversary has correlated side
information. Moreover, we provide a complete characterization
of the problem studied in [7]. Standard notations in [11] are
used.
II. SECRET KEY-BASED AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM
A. Problem Formulation
Let us consider a secret key-based authentication system
shown in Fig. 1. Source and side information alphabets,
X ,Y,Z are assumed to be finite. Let (Xn, Y n, Zn) be n-
length sequences which are i.i.d. according to PX,Y,Z .
In the enrollment stage, based on the user’s source sequence
Xn, an “encoder” generates a rate-limited description M ∈
M(n) and a secret key message S ∈ S(n). For authentication,
the user provides a (noisy) authentication sequence Y n to
the system. Based on Y n and the stored description M , a
“decoder” generates Sˆ as an estimate of the secret key. The
user will be positively authenticated if Sˆ = S.
The information leakage rate at the adversary who has
access to the stored description M and side information Zn,
correlated with Xn, is measured by the normalized mutual
information I(Xn;M,Zn)/n. The adversary, based on M and
Zn, also chooses a sequence y˜n(M,Zn) ∈ Yn for authen-
tication. The maximum false acceptance probability (mFAP)
is defined as mFAP , maxy˜n(M,Zn)∈Yn Pr(S˜y˜n = S), where
S˜y˜n is the estimate resulting from M and y˜n. We are interested
in characterizing the optimal tradeoff between the compression
rate, information leakage rate, and mFAP exponent.
Definition 1: A code for secret key-based authentication
with a privacy constraint consists of
• an encoder f (n)m : Xn →M(n),
• an encoder f (n)s : Xn → S(n),
• a decoder g(n) :M(n) × Yn → S(n),
where M(n) and S(n) are finite sets.
Definition 2: A compression-leakage-mFAP exponent tuple
(R,L,E) ∈ R3+ is said to be achievable if for any δ > 0 and
all sufficiently large n there exists a code above such that
Pr(Sˆ 6= S) ≤ δ, (1)
1
n
log
∣∣M(n)∣∣ ≤ R+ δ, (2)
1
n
I(Xn;M,Zn) ≤ L+ δ, (3)
and 1
n
log
1
mFAP
≥ E − δ. (4)
The compression-leakage-mFAP exponent region R1 is the set
of all achievable tuples.
B. Result
Theorem 1: The compression-leakage-mFAP exponent re-
gion R1 for the problem depicted in Fig. 1 is given by a set
of all tuples (R,L,E) ∈ R3+ such that
R ≥ I(X ;V |Y ), (5)
L ≥ I(X ;V, Y )− I(X ;Y |U) + I(X ;Z|U), (6)
E ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U), (7)
for some joint distributions of the form PX,Y,ZPV |XPU|V with
|U| ≤ |X |+ 3, |V| ≤ (|X |+ 3)(|X |+ 2).
Remark 1 (Randomized encoder): Theorem 1 holds also
for a more general setting which allows randomized encoders,
i.e., M and S are randomly generated according to p(m|xn)
and p(s|xn), respectively. This can be seen from the converse
proof of Theorem 1 that no assumption regarding the deter-
ministic encoders was made.
Remark 2 (Special cases):
i) When side information at the adversary is degraded, i.e.,
X − Y −Z forms a Markov chain, the compression-leakage-
mFAP exponent region is reduced to the set R1,X−Y−Z
consisting of all tuples (R,L,E) such that
R ≥ I(X ;V |Y ),
L ≥ I(X ;Z) + I(X ;V |Y ),
E ≤ I(V ;Y |Z),
for some joint distributions of the form PX,Y PZ|Y PV |X . We
obtain this region fromR1 by setting U constant. The converse
proof is modified slightly and is provided in Appendix A.
ii) When the adversary has no side information, the result
in Theorem 1 reduces to that in [6]. For example, by setting
Z and U equal to constants and R = H(X), we recover [6,
Theorem 4].
Proof of Theorem 1: The sketch of achievability proof
is given below based on a random coding argument where we
use the definitions and properties of ǫ-typicality as in [11].
Our achievable scheme utilizes layered coding and binning,
while the converse proof for the information leakage rate is
inspired by that of the secure source coding problem [9].
Achievability: Fix PV |X and PU|V . Let ǫ and δǫ be pos-
itive real numbers where δǫ → 0 as ǫ → 0. Assume that
I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U) > 0. The case where I(V ;Y |U) −
I(V ;Z|U) ≤ 0 is trivial since the encoder can just set the
secret key message to be constant and does not transmit at all,
implying that (R,L,E) = (0, I(X ;Z), 0) is achievable.
1) Codebook generation: Randomly and independently gen-
erate 2n(I(X;U)+δǫ) un(j) sequences, each i.i.d. according
to
∏n
i=1 PU (ui), j ∈ [1 : 2
n(I(X;U)+δǫ)]. Then distribute
them uniformly at random into 2n(I(X;U|Y )+2δǫ) bins bU (m1),
m1 ∈ [1 : 2
nI(X;U|Y )+2δǫ ]. For each j, randomly and
conditionally independently generate 2n(I(X;V |U)+δǫ) vn(j, k)
sequences, each i.i.d. according to
∏n
i=1 PV |U (vi|ui), k ∈
[1 : 2n(I(X;V |U)+δǫ)], and distribute these sequences uniformly
at random into 2n(I(X;V |U,Y )+3δǫ) bins bV (j,m2), m2 ∈
[1 : 2nI(X;V |U,Y )+3δǫ ]. Moreover, in each bin bV (j,m2), we
distribute sequences vn uniformly at random into subbins,
indexed by s, where s ∈ [1 : 2n(I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;Z|U)−δǫ)]. The
index s here represents a subbin index of the second-layered
bin. In each subbin, there are 2n(I(V ;Z|U)−δǫ) sequences vn,
each indexed by s′. Note that k = (m2, s, s′) here. The
codebooks are then revealed to all parties.
2) Enrollment: Given xn, the encoder looks for un(j) and
vn(j, k) that are jointly typical with xn. From the covering
lemma [11], with high probability, there exist such codeword
pairs. If there are more than one pairs, the encoder selects one
of them uniformly at random, and then sends the correspond-
ing bin indices m1 and m2 to the decoder. The total rate is thus
equal to I(X ;U |Y )+I(X ;V |U, Y )+5δǫ = I(X ;V |Y )+5δǫ.
The secret key is set to be the subbin index s in which the
chosen sequence vn ∈ bV (j,m2) falls.
3) Authentication: The decoder looks for un(j) and vn(j, k)
in the bins (m1,m2) which are jointly typical with yn. From
the packing lemma [11], with high probability, it will find
the unique sequence un(j) ∈ bU (m1) which is jointly typical
with yn. Then, with high probability, it will find the unique
vn(j, k) ∈ bV (j,m2) which is jointly typical with yn and the
decoded un(j). Finally, it puts out the corresponding subbin
index of the decoded vn as an estimate of the secret key which,
with high probability, will be equal to the generated one.
Let Un(J) and V n(J,K) be the codewords chosen at the
encoder in the enrollment stage, and (M1,M2) be the corre-
sponding indices of the bins to which Un(J) and V n(J,K)
belong. Note that (M1,M2) can be determined from (J,K).
From the enrollment stage, the sources and
selected codewords are jointly typical, i.e.,
(Xn, Un(J), V n(J,K), Y n, Zn) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ , with high
probability. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The following bound holds, H(Zn|J) ≤
n(H(Z|U) + δǫ).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
Then, the information leakage averaged over all possible
codebooks can be bounded as follows.
I(Xn;M1,M2, Z
n) = H(Xn)−H(Xn|M1,M2, Z
n)
≤ nH(X)−H(Xn|J, Zn) +H(M2)
≤ nH(X)−H(Xn, Zn) +H(J) +H(Zn|J) +H(M2)
(a)
≤ −nH(Z|X) + n(I(X ;U) + δǫ) + n(H(Z|U) + δǫ)
+ n(I(X ;V |U, Y ) + 3δǫ)
(b)
≤ n(I(X ;U,Z) + I(X ;V |U, Y ) + δ′ǫ)
(c)
= n(I(X ;V, Y )− I(X ;Y |U) + I(X ;Z|U) + δ′ǫ)
≤ n(L+ δ′ǫ),
if L ≥ I(X ;V, Y ) − I(X ;Y |U) + I(X ;Z|U), where (a)
follows from the memoryless property of the sources, from the
codebook generation, and from bounding the term H(Zn|J)
as in Lemma 1, (b) from the Markov chain U−X−Z for some
δ′ǫ ≥ 5δǫ, and (c) from the Markov chain U−V −X−(Y, Z).
As for an achievable mFAP exponent, we consider the
adversary who knows m = (m1,m2) and side information
zn and tries to select a sequence y˜n(m, zn) that results in the
estimated key S˜y˜n equal to the original key S of the person it
claims to be. From our achievable scheme, the secret key S is
chosen from the subbin index of the selected codeword V n.
Thus, the adversary only needs to consider S˜y˜n that results
from sequences V n which are jointly typical with Xn. There
are in total 2n(I(X;U,V )+2δǫ) such sequences generated.
Similarly as in [6], from the binning scheme with uniform
bin and subbin index assignment, we have that the joint
probability that a description m is selected and a certain secret
key s is chosen is equal to a total number of jointly typical
sequences vn with corresponding indices m and s divided by
a total number of jointly typical sequences vn. That is,
Pr(M = m,S = s) ≤
⌈Pr(M=m)·2n(I(X;U,V )+2δǫ)
|S|
⌉
2n(I(X;U,V )+2δǫ)
. (8)
Let g(·) denote the decoding function used for estimating
the secret key message in the achievability scheme. Then
mFAP = max
y˜n(M,Zn)∈Yn
Pr(S˜y˜n = S)
= max
y˜n(M,Zn)∈Yn
Pr(g(M, y˜n(M,Zn)) = S)
≤
∑
m=1,...,|M|
∑
zn
max
y˜n(m,zn)∈Yn
Pr(M = m,Zn = zn,
g(m, y˜n(m, zn)) = S)
=
∑
m
∑
zn
max
y˜n(m,zn)∈Yn
Pr(M = m,S = g(m, y˜n(m, zn)))·
Pr(Zn = zn|M = m,S = g(m, y˜n(m, zn)))
(a)
≤
∑
m
⌈Pr(M = m) · 2n(I(X;U,V )+2δǫ)
|S|
⌉
·
1
2n(I(X;U,V )+2δǫ)
≤
∑
m
(Pr(M = m) · 2n(I(X;U,V )+2δǫ)
|S|
+ 1
)
·
1
2n(I(X;U,V )+2δǫ)
(b)
= 2−n(I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;Z|U)−δǫ) + 2−n(I(V ;Y )−3δǫ)
(c)
≤ 2−n(I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;Z|U)−δ
′
ǫ),
where (a) follows from the uniform bin and subbin in-
dex assignment in the achievable scheme and the bound
in (8), (b) follows from the code construction where
|S| = 2n(I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;Z|U)−δǫ) and |M| = |M1||M2| =
2n(I(X;V |Y )+5δǫ), and (c) follows from the Markov chain
U − V − Y which results in I(V ;Y ) ≥ I(V ;Y |U).
That is, we have
1
n
log
1
mFAP
≥ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)− δ′ǫ ≥ E − δ
′
ǫ,
if E ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U).
Converse: Let Ui , (M,Y ni+1, Zi−1) and Vi ,
(M,S, Y ni+1, Z
i−1) which satisfy Ui − Vi − Xi − (Yi, Zi)
for all i = 1, . . . , n as Ui is included in Vi and (Yi, Zi) is
independent of Vi given Xi due to the memoryless property
of the side information channel PY,Z|X . For any achievable
tuple (R,L,E) ∈ R3+, it follows that
n(R+ δn) ≥ H(M) ≥ H(M |Y
n)−H(M,S|Xn, Y n, Zn)
= H(M,S|Y n)−H(S|M,Y n)−H(M,S|Xn, Y n, Zn)
(a)
≥ I(M,S;Xn, Zn|Y n)− nǫn
(b)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi, Zi|Yi)−H(Xi, Zi|Vi, Yi)− nǫn
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Vi|Yi)− nǫn,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality H(S|M,Y n) ≤ nǫn
and (b) follows from the definition of Vi and that conditioning
reduces entropy.
The information leakage can be bounded as follows.
n(L+ δn) ≥ I(X
n;M,Zn) = I(Xn;M,S, Y n)
− I(Xn;S|M,Y n)− I(Xn;Y n|M) + I(Xn;Zn|M)
(a)
≥ I(Xn;M,S, Y n)− nǫn − I(X
n;Y n|M) + I(Xn;Zn|M)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi)−H(Xi|M,S,X
i−1, Y n)−H(Yi|M,Y
n
i+1)
+H(Yi|M,Y
n
i+1, X
n) +H(Zi|M,Z
i−1)
−H(Zi|M,Z
i−1, Xn)− nǫn
(b)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi)−H(Xi|M,S,X
i−1, Y n, Zi−1)− I(Yi;Xi)
+ I(Yi;M,Y
n
i+1) + I(Zi;Xi)− I(Zi;M,Z
i−1)− nǫn
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;M,S, Y
n
i , Z
i−1)− I(Yi;Xi) + I(Zi;Xi)
+ I(Yi;M,Z
i−1, Y ni+1)− I(Zi;M,Z
i−1, Y ni+1)− nǫn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Vi, Yi)− I(Yi;Xi|Ui) + I(Zi;Xi|Ui)− nǫn,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from
the Markov chains Xi − (M,S,X i−1, Y n) − Zi−1 and
(Yi, Zi) − Xi − (M,Y
n
i+1, Z
i−1, Xn\i), (c) follows from
the Csisza´r’s sum identity [12], ∑ni=1 I(Yi;Zi−1|M,Y ni+1)−
I(Zi;Y
n
i+1|M,Z
i−1) = 0, (d) follows from the definitions of
Ui and Vi and the Markov chain Ui −Xi − (Yi, Zi).
Lastly, the bound on mFAP exponent n(E − δn) ≤∑n
i=1 I(Vi;Yi|Ui)−I(Vi;Zi|Ui) can be shown similarly as in
[6] with some modification. This part of the proof is provided
in Appendix C. The proof ends with the standard steps for
single letterization using a time-sharing random variable and
letting δn, ǫn → 0 as n → ∞. The cardinality bounds on the
sets U and V can be proved using the support lemma [12],
and is shown in Appendix D.
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Fig. 2. Secret key generation for authentication with a privacy constraint.
C. Binary Example
To demonstrate the derived tradeoff, let us consider a
simple binary example of the special case in Remark 2i). Let
X ∼ Bern(1/2), Y is an erased version of X with erasure
probability p, and Z is an erased version of Y with erasure
probability q. The region R1,X−Y−Z in Remark 2i) reduces
to the set of all (R,L,E) such that
R ≥ p(1− h(α)),
L ≥ (1− q)(1 − p) + p(1− h(α)),
E ≤ q(1− p)(1 − h(α)),
for some α ∈ [0, 1/2]. The proof is given in Appendix E.
We can see for example that there is a tradeoff between the
mFAP exponent and the leakage rate, i.e., in order to increase
the mFAP exponent, we need to allow some more leakage.
III. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH PRIVACY
CONSTRAINT
In this section, we consider a related problem setting
depicted in Fig. 2 where, instead of maximizing the mFAP
exponent, we are interested in maximizing the secret key rate
generated at the enrollment stage as well as protecting the
secret key from any inference of an adversary who has access
to the description M and side information Zn. This setting
without the compression rate constraint was studied in [7]
where the authors characterized inner and outer bounds to the
leakage-key rate region. Moreover, it is closely related to the
one-way secret key generation with rate constraint in [13].
A. Problem Formulation
The problem setting follows similarly as that in Sec-
tion II-A, except that the mFAP constraint in (4) is replaced
by the key rate and key leakage constraints.
Definition 3: A tuple (R,L,Rs) ∈ R3+ is said to be achiev-
able if for any δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n there exists a
code consisting of encoders and a decoder (as in Definition 1)
such that (1)-(3) hold and
1
n
H(S) ≥ Rs − δ, (9)
1
n
I(S;M,Zn) ≤ δ. (10)
The compression-leakage-key rate region R2 is the set of all
achievable tuples.
B. Result
Theorem 2: The compression-leakage-key rate region R2
for the problem in Fig. 2 is given by a set of all tuples
(R,L,Rs) ∈ R
3
+ such that
R ≥ I(X ;V |Y ), (11)
L ≥ I(X ;V, Y )− I(X ;Y |U) + I(X ;Z|U), (12)
Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U), (13)
for some joint distributions of the form PX,Y,ZPV |XPU|V with
|U| ≤ |X |+ 3, |V| ≤ (|X |+ 3)(|X |+ 2).
Remark 3: Although different achievable schemes were
used, the inner bound in [7] coincides with the compression-
leakage-key rate region R2 where R = H(X). Here we pro-
vide the complete result by establishing a matching converse.
In addition, the extra compression rate constraint is considered
where the layered binning scheme is shown to be optimal.
Remark 4: The regions specified in Theorems 1 and 2 have
the same form. In particular, the maximum secret key rate in
Theorem 2 is equal to the maximum mFAP exponent presented
in Theorem 1. Intuitively, this follows from the fact that
the coding scheme used to prove Theorem 1 also achieves
negligible key leakage rate, implying that the adversary has
no useful knowledge about the key. It can then only guess
the key from possible values in the set S whose cardinality
is at least 2H(S). A similar observation for the case without
adversary’s side information was noted in [6].
Proof of Theorem 2: Proofs for the compression rate R
and leakage rate L remain the same as those of Theorem 1.
Here we only provide the proof of the secret key rate.
Achievability: With the same achievable scheme as in the
proof of Theorem 1, it follows that
H(S) ≥ H(S|J,M2, S
′) = H(S, J,M2, S
′)−H(J,M2, S
′)
(a)
≥ H(Un, V n)−H(J)−H(M2)−H(S
′)
(b)
≥ n(I(X ;U, V )− 2δǫ)− n(I(X ;U) + δǫ)
− n(I(X ;V |U, Y ) + 3δǫ)− (I(V ;Z|U)− δǫ)
≥ n(I(Y ;V |U)− I(Z;V |U)− δ′ǫ) ≥ n(Rs − δ
′
ǫ),
if Rs ≤ I(Y ;V |U) − I(Z;V |U), where (a) follows since
(Un, V n) are functions of (J,K) = (J,M2, S, S′) given the
codebook, and (b) follows from the codebook generation and
the properties of jointly typical sequences, i.e., p(un, vn) ≤∑
xn∈T
(n)
ǫ (X|un,vn)
p(xn) ≤ 2−n(I(X;U,V )−2δǫ).
The key leakage averaged over all possible codebooks can
be bounded as follows.
I(S;M1,M2, Z
n) ≤ H(S)−H(S|J,M2, Z
n)
= H(S)−H(S, J,M2, Z
n) +H(J,M2, Z
n)
≤ H(S)−H(S, J,M2, Z
n, S′) +H(S′|S, J,M2, Z
n)
+H(J) +H(M2) +H(Z
n|J)
(a)
≤ H(S)−H(Un, V n, Zn) + nǫn +H(J)
+H(M2) +H(Z
n|J)
(b)
≤ H(S)− n(I(X ;U, V ) +H(Z|U, V )− 3δǫ)
+ nǫn + n(I(X ;U) + δǫ) + n(I(X ;V |U, Y ) + 3δǫ)
+ n(H(Z|U) + δǫ)
(c)
≤ nδ′′ǫ ,
where (a) follows since (Un, V n) are functions of (J,K) =
(J,M2, S, S
′) given the codebook, and from the Fano’s
inequality H(S′|S, J,M2, Zn) ≤ nǫn (this is due to the
codebook generation in which the size of S ′ for a given
(J,M2, S) is less than 2nI(V ;Z|U) and therefore with high
probability S′ can be decoded given (S, J,M2, Zn)), (b)
follows from bounding the term H(Un, V n, Zn) using prop-
erties of jointly typical sequences, i.e., p(un, vn, zn) ≤
2−n(H(Z)+I(X;U,V |Z)−3δǫ) = 2−n(I(X;U,V )+H(Z|U,V )−3δǫ),
from the code construction, and from Lemma 1, and (c) from
the code construction that S ∈ [1 : 2n(I(Y ;V |U)−I(Z;V |U)−δǫ)].
Converse: Ui and Vi are defined as in the converse proof
of Theorem 1. For any achievable Rs, it follows that
n(Rs − δn) ≤ H(S) = H(S|M,Z
n) + I(S;M,Zn)
(a)
≤ H(S|M,Zn) + nδn
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Yi|Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui) + nδn + nǫn,
where (a) follows from the key leakage constraint and (b)
follows from the steps from (16) to (17).
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APPENDIX A
CONVERSE PROOF OF REGION R1,X−Y−Z
Let Vi , (M,S, Y ni+1, Zn\i) which satisfies Vi−Xi−Yi−Zi
for all i = 1, . . . , n. For any achievable tuple (R,L,E), it
follows that
n(R+ δn) ≥ H(M)
≥ H(M |Y n, Zn)−H(M,S|Xn, Y n, Zn)
= H(M,S|Y n, Zn)−H(S|M,Y n, Zn)
−H(M,S|Xn, Y n, Zn)
(a)
≥ I(M,S;Xn|Y n, Zn)− nǫn
(b)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Vi|Yi)− nǫn,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality H(S|M,Y n) ≤ nǫn
and (b) follows from the Markov chain Xi − Yi − Zi, the
definition of Vi, and that conditioning reduces entropy.
The information leakage,
n(L+ δn)
≥ I(Xn;M,Zn) = I(Xn;Zn) + I(Xn;M |Zn)
(a)
≥ I(Xn;Zn) +H(M |Zn, Y n)−H(M |Xn, Y n, Zn)
(b)
≥ I(Xn;Zn) +H(M,S|Zn, Y n)− nǫn
−H(M,S|Xn, Y n, Zn)
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi) +H(Xi|Yi)−H(Xi|Vi, Yi)− nǫn,
where (a) follows from the Markov chain M − (Xn, Zn) −
Y n, (b) follows from Fano’s inequality, (c) follows from the
Markov chains Xi − Yi − Zi and the definition of Vi.
The bound on mFAP exponent follows similarly as in the
converse proof of Theorem 1, except that the steps from (16)
to (17) are replaced by
H(S|M,Zn)
(a)
≤ H(S|M,Zn)−H(S|M,Y n) + nǫn
(b)
= H(S|M,Zn)−H(S|M,Y n, Zn) + nǫn
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Zi)−H(Yi|Vi, Zi) + nǫn,
where (a) from Fano’s inequality, (b) from the Markov chain
(S,M)− Y n − Zn, and (c) from the definition of Vi.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let E be a binary random variable taking value 0 if
(Xn, Un(J), V n(J,K), Y n, Zn) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ , and 1 otherwise.
Since (Xn, Un(J), V n(J,K), Y n, Zn) ∈ T (n)ǫ with high
probability, we have Pr(E = 1) ≤ δǫ. It follows that
H(Zn|J) ≤ H(Zn|Un, E) +H(E)
≤ Pr(E = 0)H(Zn|Un, E = 0)
+ Pr(E = 1)H(Zn|Un, E = 1) + h(δǫ)
≤ H(Zn|Un, E = 0) + δǫH(Z
n) + h(δǫ)
≤ H(Zn|Un, E = 0) + nδǫ log |Z|+ h(δǫ)
=
∑
un∈T
(n)
ǫ
p(un|E = 0)H(Zn|Un = un, E = 0)
+ nδǫ log |Z|+ h(δǫ)
≤
∑
un∈T
(n)
ǫ
p(un|E = 0) log |T (n)ǫ (Z|u
n)|+ nδǫ log |Z|
+ h(δǫ) ≤ n(H(Z|U) + δ
′
ǫ),
where h(·) is the binary entropy function, and the last inequal-
ity follows from the property of jointly typical set [11] with
δǫ, δ
′
ǫ → 0 as ǫ→ 0, and ǫ→ 0 as n→∞.
APPENDIX C
CONVERSE PROOF OF THE MFAP EXPONENT BOUND
Similarly as in [6], let us define the set of secret key
messages that can be reconstructed from m, i.e., C(m) = {s :
there exists a sequence yn ∈ Yn s.t. g(n)(m, yn) = s}. Also,
let C(s,m) = 1 for s ∈ C(m), and 0 otherwise. We have that
δn ≥ Pr(Sˆ 6= S) ≥
∑
m Pr(M = m,S /∈ C(m)) = Pr(C =
0). An adversary who knows m and zn can choose a sequence
y˜n that results in the MAP estimate, i.e.,
s˜(m, zn) = arg max
s∈C(m)
p(s|m, zn), (14)
and achieves
FAP =
∑
m,zn
Pr(s˜ = S,M = m,Zn = zn)
(a)
=
∑
m,zn
p(m, zn) max
s∈C(m)
p(s|m, zn)
≥
∑
m,zn
p(m, zn) max
s∈C(m)
p(s, C = 1|m, zn)
≥
∑
m,zn
p(m, zn)p(C = 1|m, zn) max
s∈C(m)
p(s|m, zn, C = 1),
(15)
where (a) follows from (14). Then for any achievable E, it
follows that
n(E − δn) ≤ log
( 1
mFAP
)
≤ log
( 1
FAP
)
(a)
≤ − log
(
Pr(C = 1)
)
− log
( ∑
m,zn
p(m, zn|C = 1) max
s∈C(m)
p(s|m, zn, C = 1)
)
(b)
≤ − log(1− δn)
−
∑
m,zn
p(m, zn|C = 1) log
(
max
s∈C(m)
p(s|m, zn, C = 1)
)
≤ − log(1− δn)−
∑
m,zn
p(m, zn|C = 1)·
∑
s∈C(m)
p(s|m, zn, C = 1) log(p(s|m, zn, C = 1))
= − log(1− δn) +H(S|M,Z
n, C = 1),
where (a) follows from (15) and (b) follows from Pr(C =
1) ≥ 1− δn and Jensen’s inequality [14].
Continuing the chain of inequalities where
(1 − δn)H(S|M,Z
n, C = 1) ≤ Pr(C = 1)H(S|M,Zn, C =
1) ≤ H(S|M,Zn), we get
(1 − δn) · [n(E − δn) + log(1− δn)]
≤ H(S|M,Zn) (16)
(a)
≤ H(S|M,Zn)−H(S|M,Y n) + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
I(S;Yi|M,Y
n
i+1)− I(S;Zi|M,Z
i−1) + nǫn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(S,Zi−1;Yi|M,Y
n
i+1)− I(S, Y
n
i+1;Zi|M,Z
i−1)
+ nǫn
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(S;Yi|M,Y
n
i+1, Z
i−1)− I(S;Zi|M,Y
n
i+1, Z
i−1)
+ nǫn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Yi|Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui) + nǫn, (17)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, and (b) and (c) from
the Csisza´r’s sum identity
∑n
i=1 I(Z
i−1;Yi|M,S, Y
n
i+1) −
I(Y ni+1;Zi|M,S,Z
i−1) = 0 =
∑n
i=1 I(Z
i−1;Yi|M,Y
n
i+1) −
I(Y ni+1;Zi|M,Z
i−1), and (d) from the definitions Ui ,
(M,Y ni+1, Z
i−1) and Vi , (M,S, Y ni+1, Zi−1).
APPENDIX D
CARDINALITY BOUNDS OF THE SETS U AND V IN
THEOREM 1
Consider the expression of R1 in Theorem 1:
R ≥ I(X ;V |Y ),
L ≥ I(X ;V, Y )− I(X ;Y |U) + I(X ;Z|U),
E ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U),
for some U ∈ U , V ∈ V such that U −V −X− (Y, Z) forms
a Markov chain.
We can rewrite some mutual information terms in the
expression above as
R ≥ H(X |Y )−H(X,Y |V ) +H(Y |V ),
L ≥ H(X)−H(X,Y |V ) +H(Y |V )−H(Y |U) +H(Y |X)
+H(Z|U)−H(Z|X),
E ≤ H(Y |U)−H(Y |V )−H(Z|U) +H(Z|V ).
We will show that the random variables U and V may
be replaced by new ones, satisfying |U| ≤ |X | + 3,
|V| ≤ (|X | + 3)(|X | + 2), and preserving the terms
H(X,Y |V ), H(Y |V ), H(Z|V ), and H(Y |U)−H(Z|U).
First, we bound the cardinality of the set U . Let us define
the following |X |+ 3 continuous functions of p(v|u), v ∈ V ,
fj(p(v|u)) =
∑
v∈V
p(v|u)p(x|u, v), j = 1, . . . , |X | − 1,
f|X |(p(v|u)) = H(X,Y |V, U = u)
= H(X,Y, V |U = u)−H(V |U = u),
f|X |+1(p(v|u)) = H(Y |V, U = u)
= H(Y, V |U = u)−H(V |U = u),
f|X |+2(p(v|u)) = H(Z|V, U = u)
= H(Z, V |U = u)−H(V |U = u),
f|X |+3(p(v|u)) = H(Y |U = u)−H(Z|U = u).
The corresponding averages are
∑
u∈U
p(u)fj(p(v|u)) = PX(x), j = 1, . . . , |X | − 1,
∑
u∈U
p(u)f|X |(p(v|u)) = H(X,Y, V |U)−H(V |U),
∑
u∈U
p(u)f|X |+1(p(v|u)) = H(Y, V |U)−H(V |U),
∑
u∈U
p(u)f|X |+2(p(v|u)) = H(Z, V |U)−H(V |U),
∑
u∈U
p(u)f|X |+3(p(v|u)) = H(Y |U)−H(Z|U).
According to the support lemma [12], we can deduce that
there exists a new random variable U ′ jointly distributed with
(X,Y, Z, V ) whose alphabet size is |U ′| = |X | + 3, and
numbers αi ≥ 0 with
∑|X |+3
i=1 αi = 1 that satisfy
|X |+3∑
i=1
αifj(PV |U ′(v|i)) = PX(x), j = 1, . . . , |X | − 1,
|X |+3∑
i=1
αif|X |(PV |U ′(v|i)) = H(X,Y, V |U
′)−H(V |U ′),
|X |+3∑
i=1
αif|X |+1(PV |U ′(v|i)) = H(Y, V |U
′)−H(V |U ′),
|X |+3∑
i=1
αif|X |+2(PV |U ′(v|i)) = H(Z, V |U
′)−H(V |U ′),
|X |+3∑
i=1
αif|X |+3(PV |U ′(v|i)) = H(Y |U
′)−H(Z|U ′).
Note that we have
H(X,Y, V |U ′)−H(V |U ′)
= H(X,Y, V |U)−H(V |U)
(a)
= H(X,Y |V ),
where (a) follows from the Markov chain U − V −
X − (Y, Z). Similarly, from the Markov chain U − V −
X − (Y, Z), we have that H(Y, V |U ′) − H(V |U ′) =
H(Y, V |U) − H(V |U) = H(Y |V ), and H(Z, V |U ′) −
H(V |U ′) = H(Z, V |U) − H(V |U) = H(Z|V ). Since
PX(x) is preserved, PX,Y,Z(x, y, z) is also preserved. Thus,
H(X |Y ), H(Y |X), H(Z|X) are preserved.
Next we bound the cardinality of the set V . For each u′ ∈
U ′, we define the following |X | + 2 continuous functions of
p(x|u′, v), x ∈ X ,
fj(p(x|u
′, v)) = p(x|u′, v), j = 1, . . . , |X | − 1,
f|X |(p(x|u
′, v)) = H(X,Y |U ′ = u′, V = v),
f|X |+1(p(x|u
′, v)) = H(Y |U ′ = u′, V = v),
f|X |+2(p(x|u
′, v)) = H(Z|U ′ = u′, V = v).
Similarly to the previous part in bounding |U|, there exists
a new random variable V ′|{U ′ = u′} ∼ p(v′|u′) such that
|V ′| = |X |+2 and p(x|u′), H(X,Y |U ′ = u′, V ), H(Y |U ′ =
u′, V ), and H(Z|U ′ = u′, V ) are preserved.
By setting V ′′ = (V ′, U ′) where V ′′ = V ′ × U ′, we have
that U ′ − V ′′ −X − (Y, Z) forms a Markov chain.
Furthermore, we have the following preservations by V ′′,
H(X,Y |V ′′)
= H(X,Y |V ′, U ′)
(a)
= H(X,Y |V, U ′)
(b)
= H(X,Y |V, U)
(c)
= H(X,Y |V ),
where (a) follows from preservation by V ′, (b) follows from
preservation by U ′, and (c) follows from the Markov chain
U − V −X − (Y, Z). Similarly, from preservation by U ′ and
V ′, and the Markov chain U − V − X − (Y, Z), we have
that H(Y |V ′′) = H(Y |V ′, U ′) = H(Y |V ) and H(Z|V ′′) =
H(Z|V ′, U ′) = H(Z|V ).
Therefore, we have shown that U ∈ U and V ∈ V may be
replaced by U ′ ∈ U ′ and V ′′ ∈ V ′′ satisfying
|U ′| = |X |+ 3,
|V ′′| = |U ′||V ′| = (|X |+ 3)(|X |+ 2),
and preserving the terms H(X,Y |V ), H(Y |V ), H(Z|V ), and
H(Y |U)−H(Z|U).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THE COMPRESSION-LEAKAGE-MFAP
EXPONENT REGION IN THE BINARY EXAMPLE
Achievability: Let V be an output of a BSC(α) with input
X . Then it follows from the expression of R1,X−Y−Z that
R ≥ I(X ;V |Y )
(a)
= p · (H(X)−H(X |V ))
(b)
= p · (1 − h(α)),
where (a) follows since Y = e with probability p, otherwise
Y = X , and (b) follows from the choice of V ,
L ≥ I(X ;Z) + I(X ;V |Y )
(a)
= 1−H(X |Z) + p · (1− h(α))
(b)
= 1− ((1 − p)q + p) + p · (1− h(α))
= (1− q)(1 − p) + p · (1− h(α)),
where (a) follows from the bound on R and (b) follows since
Z = e with probability (1− p)q + p, otherwise Z = X .
E ≤ I(Y ;V |Z)
(a)
= I(X ;V |Z)− I(X ;V |Y )
(b)
= ((1 − p)q + p) · I(X ;V )− p · (1 − h(α))
= q(1− p)(1− h(α)),
where (a) follows from the Markov chain V − X − Y − Z
and (b) follows since Z = e with probability (1 − p)q + p,
otherwise Z = X .
Converse: Let (R,L,E) be an achievable tuple. We now
prove that there exist α ∈ [0, 1/2] satisfying the inequalities
shown in the achievability above. From R1,X−Y−Z , we have
the following bound on the compression rate R.
R ≥ I(X ;V |Y )
= p · I(X ;V )
= p · (1−H(X |V )).
Since 0 ≤ H(X |V ) ≤ H(X) = 1, and h(·) is a continuous
one-to-one mapping from [0, 1/2] to [0, 1], there exists α ∈
[0, 1/2] s.t. H(X |V ) = h(α), and thus R ≥ p · (1 − h(α)).
The bounds on L and E readily follow from H(X |V ) = h(α).
